| 摘要: |
| 基于地方政府竞争视角,构建了中国地方政府之间的环境规制演化博弈模型,根据复制动态方程得到了博弈参与方的演化稳定策略,探究了中国跨区域环境规制中不同地方政府的策略选择规律和相关影响因素。结果表明:在中国地方政府间环境规制演化博弈中,环境(经济)指标在政绩考核体系中的权重以及地方政府严格执行环境规制时的执行成本等,都是地方政府环境规制决策的重要影响因素。因此,为了促进地方政府严格执行环境规制,各级政府在制定环境规制政策时应该格外重视这些因素。研究成果探析了中国环境污染问题的深层原因以及环境规制失灵的内在机理,期望为促进环境规制的严格执行提供理论依据。 |
| 关键词: 地方政府竞争 环境规制 演化博弈 复制动态方程 演化稳定策略 |
| DOI：10.13216/j.cnki.upcjess.2020.04.0002 |
| 分类号:X321;O225 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71874074);教育部人文社会科学基金规划项目(18YJC630208);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(18LZUJBWYJ038);国家留学基金委建设高水平大学公派留学项目(201706180034) |
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| Research on Evolutionary Game Strategy of Cross-Regional Environmental Regulation from the Perspective of Local Government Competition |
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ZHANG Zhenhua, ZHANG Guoxing
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(School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China)
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| Abstract: |
| From the perspective of local government competition, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of environmental regulation between Chinese local governments, obtains the evolutionary stability strategy of game participants based on the replicator dynamic equation, and explores the strategic choices and related influencing factors of different local governments in China 's cross-regional environmental regulation. The results show that the weight of environmental (economic) indicators in the performance evaluation system, the implementation cost of local governments strictly enforcing environmental regulation, and so on, are important factors influencing the local government 's environmental regulation and decision-making in the evolution of environmental regulation between different local governments. Therefore, in order to promote local governments to strictly implement environmental regulation, governments at all levels should be particularly aware of these influencing factors when formulating environmental regulation policies. The results of the study are expected to be able to explore the underlying causes of China 's environmental pollution problems and the internal mechanisms of environmental regulation failures, providing a theoretical basis for promoting the strict implementation of environmental regulation. |
| Key words: local government competition environmental regulation evolutionary game replicator dynamic equation evolutionary stability strategy |
