摘要: |
将自由意志作为一簇能力的解读在当代实验哲学兴起的背景下,随着艾迪·纳米亚斯(Eddy Nahmias)等哲学家的提倡而兴起。这一解读避免了传统相容论和决定论的问题,同时坚持了一种自然化路径,但自然化与规范化的张力迫使人们在“是”与“应当”间做出抉择。解决方案在于发现自由意志的德性内涵。自由意志以自我实现为目的,这显示了其与德性的同构性。此外,它也是一种规范化的能力,具因果性与在理由空间中的规范性双重维度。正是因为这一理由空间中不断追问的规范性维度,作为“总德”的正义、公平才得以可能。只有展明自由意志的德性内涵,我们才能摆脱陈旧的自然与精神之隔阂,迈向实践的成人之路。 |
关键词: 自由意志 德性 决定论 相容主义 理由空间 |
DOI:10.13216/j.cnki.upcjess.2020.04.0013 |
分类号:B15 |
基金项目: |
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Free Will:A Variation Between Ability and Virtue |
JI Shaowen
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(Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510275, China)
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Abstract: |
The interpretation of free will as a cluster of abilities emerged in the context of the rise of contemporary experimental philosophy, with the advocacy of philosophers such as Eddy Nahmias. This interpretation avoids the problems of traditional compatibilism and determinism, and at the same time adheres to a naturalization approach, but the tension between naturalization and normalization forces people to make choices between "is" and "ought". The solution lies in discovering the virtue connotation of free will. Free will aims at self-realization, which shows its isomorphism with virtue. Besides, it is a normalized ability, which has two dimensions of causality and norms in the space of reasons. It is the normative dimension that makes justice and fairness as "the total virtue" possible. Only by demonstrating free will as a virtue can we get rid of the old barriers between nature and spirit, and move towards the path of self-completeness. |
Key words: free will virtue determinism compatibilism space of reasons |