摘要: |
日趋严峻的碳排放约束、急剧扩张的可再生能源装机规模以及大规模的“弃风、弃光”行为间相互制约,严重阻碍了我国电力系统的低碳、智能转型。基于政府对发电企业节能减排行为和电网企业可再生能源保障性收购的双重监管,构建电网企业和发电企业间的演化博弈模型,分析三者间的利益冲突与合作过程,进而探究博弈影响因素和协作发展轨迹。研究发现:政府监管力度对企业达标行为具有直接影响,企业达标概率与政府设置的惩罚系数值正相关,其中电网企业对其敏感性更高;通过技术革新降低企业生产成本比单一地提高惩罚系数对提升企业达标积极性具有更好的激励效果。为了强化能源规制政策效果,切实达成预期的减排和消纳目标,我国需从制度上迈出“监管推动发展”的怪圈。政府应结合泛在电力物联网激发企业的创新发展意识和自主达标意识,尽快建立完善的电力市场,并积极引入第三方以降低能源规制的监管成本,最终达到环境友好、能源清洁、智能高效的电力系统转型目标。 |
关键词: 双重监管体制 能源规制 可再生能源消纳 演化博弈 |
DOI:10.13216/j.cnki.upcjess.2021.01.0001 |
分类号:F426.2 |
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71874074);教育部人文社会科学计划基金项目(18YJC630208);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2019M663857) |
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Game Analysis on the Consumption of Renewable Energy under the Government Supervision |
LI Long1, NIE Yan2,3, ZHI Jing1, ZHANG Guoxing2,3
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(1.Information and Communication Company, State Grid Gansu Electric Power Company,Lanzhou, Gansu 730050, China;2.School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China;3.Institute of Green Finance, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China)
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Abstract: |
The mutual constraints between the increasingly stringent carbon emission constraints, the rapidly expanding installed capacity of renewable energy and the large-scale abandonment of wind and solar power seriously hindered the intelligent low-carbon transition of power system. Based on the government 's regulation for reducing emission and guaranteed acquisition of renewable energy, we first construct an evolutionary game model between power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises and analyze the conflict of interest and cooperation among the government, power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises so as to explore the game influencing factors and their collaborative development. The results show that the government supervision has a direct impact on corporate compliance behavior and that the company 's full compliance probability is positively related to the government 's penalty coefficient. Among them, grid companies are more sensitive to the penalty coefficient. Furthermore, reducing production cost of enterprises by technological innovation has a better incentive effect on improving the enthusiasm of enterprises than simply improving penalty coefficient. In order to strengthen the effect of energy regulation policies and achieve the expected emission reduction and consumption goals, we should break the system cycle of "development driven by supervision". The government should combine the ubiquitous power Internet to stimulate the company 's awareness of innovative development and initiative to achieve standards, establish a sound electricity market and actively introduce third-party participation to reduce the regulatory costs of energy regulation, so as to achieve the transition goal for an environment-friendly, clean-energy, intelligent and efficient power system. |
Key words: dual supervision system energy regulation renewable energy consumption evolutionary game |