| 摘要: |
| 企业管理的薪酬并不是随着企业的出现而产生的,而是有限责任制和股份制为代表的现代企业制度的产物。高管报酬与企业绩效之间存在正相关性,但也有许多研究否认了这种关系。高管薪酬,在中国大陆应该还是一个新鲜事件,但在美国,却是由来已久。与美国相比,中国高管薪酬有其自身的特点,国企高管薪酬的失控原因之一是国企产权不明。政府介入高管薪酬只能是一种非常规手段,而企业高管薪酬的决定权最终应该由企业董事会拥有。 |
| 关键词: 高管薪酬 绩效 产权 政府介入 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:F244.2 |
| 基金项目: |
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| Research on the Issue of Senior Executive Compensation |
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PENG Xing ting, QIU Ben
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(Institute of Industrial Economics, Jiangxi Financial and Economic University, Nanchang, Jiangxi 361005, China)
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| Abstract: |
| Salaries from enterprise management are not the result of the emergence of companies, but of the modern enterprise system which is represented by the limited responsibility system and stock system. There exists a positive correlation between high management salaries and enterprise performance, which was denied in many researches. High management salary is still a new event in the mainland of China, but in the United States, is not. In contrast with that of the United States, high management salary in China has its own characteristics, and the cause that high management salary in state owned enterprises was out of control is due to the un clarity of the state owned enterprises property right. The government intervention should be only an unconventional means, and the decision making power of high management salary should be ultimately owned by corporate boards. |
| Key words: senior executive compensation performance unclarity of property right government intervention |
