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考虑产品绿色度和营销努力的制造供应链成本分担契约研究
刘丙泉1,郑湘儒1,常旭冉1,孟令奇1,郝红文2
(1.中国石油大学(华东) 经济管理学院,山东 青岛 266580;2.山东省能源安全调度中心,山东 济南 250014)
摘要:
工业化的迅速发展导致人与自然的矛盾日益突出,绿色产品受到越来越多消费者的青睐,许多制造商和零售商开始生产和营销绿色产品以满足消费者的需求。通过研究制造商和零售商分别为主导的二级绿色制造供应链,采用Stackelberg博弈方法研究需求依赖于产品绿色度和营销努力时的供应链决策与协调问题,提出研发成本和营销成本分担契约。研究发现:(1)制造商和零售商分别为主导时,当研发成本分担系数和营销成本分担系数满足一定的条件范围时,契约供应链将优于无成本分担时的供应链。(2)制造商为主导时,随着研发成本分担契约参数λ的逐渐增大,产品零售价格、产品批发价格、产品绿色度和营销努力水平都呈现出先增后减的趋势。(3)零售商为主导时,随着营销成本分担契约参数μ逐渐增大,产品零售价格、产品批发价格、产品绿色度都呈现出下降的趋势,而营销努力水平呈现出上升的趋势。最后使用数值仿真,对研究结论和重要参数进行仿真分析。
关键词:  产品绿色度  营销努力  Stackelberg博弈  成本分担契约
DOI:10.13216/j.cnki.upcjess.2022.02.0011
分类号:X322;F426
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71804189)
Research on Supply Chain Cost Sharing Contract Considering Green Product Level and Marketing Efforts
LIU Bingquan1,ZHENG Xiangru1,CHANG Xuran1,MENG Lingqi1,HAO Hongwen2
(1.School of Economics and Management, China university of petroleum (east China), Qingdao 266580, Shandong, China;2.Energy security dispatching center of Shandong, Jinan 250014, Shandong China)
Abstract:
The article explores the secondary green manufacturing supply chain led by manufacturers and retailers, focusing on the supply chain decision-making and coordination issues entailed by the demand for green product levels and marketing endeavors with the aid of Stackelberg game method and proposes the R&D cost and marketing cost sharing contracts respectively. The study found that:(1)the contract-bound supply chain outperforms the costcharing-free one when led by the manufacturers and retailers, the R&D cost sharing coefficient and marketing cost sharing coefficient meet certain conditions. (2)the product retail and wholesale price, the green levels and the marketing endeavors show trends of increasing initially, followed by decreasing when guided by the manufacturer, the R&D cost sharing contract parameter λ is on gradual increase. (3) the product retail and wholesale price, the green levels show signs of a downward trend with the marketing endeavors on the increase when directed by the retailer, the marketing cost sharing contract parameter μ is on an incremental rise. Finally, the numerical simulation is applied to verify the conclusions and important parameters of this article.
Key words:  green product levels  marketing endeavors  Stackelberg game  cost-sharing contract